

# POLITICAL TERRORISM

Theory, tactics, and  
counter-measures

SECOND EDITION  
REVISED AND EXTENDED

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## The problem of defining terrorism

Groups with little or no direct political power have demonstrated repeatedly in recent years that by employing certain tactics, central to which is the use of directed terror, they can achieve effects on a target community which are out of all proportion to their numerical or political power. Such tactics attract worldwide publicity, create widespread panic or apprehension and cause national governments to concede to the demands of small subgroups within society. These effects in themselves create a demand for an understanding of the use of terror for political ends. In attempting such an undertaking it is desirable first to ascertain the substance of the threat – to separate the reality from the media image, to ascertain whether current terrorism is an outgrowth of past uses of terror or a unique phenomenon generated by new political forces. In addition to understanding its genesis and contemporary motivation there is a need to assess whether new developments such as transportation, communication, and weaponry give the use of terror more leverage than past forms of terror and therefore result in a greater threat than in the past.

The first analytical task facing commentators on terror is to define their subject matter. Because terrorism engenders such extreme emotions, partly as a reaction to the horrors associated with it and partly because of its ideological context, the search for a definition which is both precise enough to provide a meaningful analytical device yet general enough to obtain agreement from all participants in the debate is fraught with difficulty. Because of these problems, many analysts have tried to shrug them off with an obligatory reference to that famous phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. This phrase, trite though it may be, does encapsulate the difficulties facing those who wish to delimit the boundaries of terrorism either for purposes of international action or academic research. Reference to it should not, though, persuade the reader of the futility of searching for the holy grail of a working definition of terrorism. Without a basic definition it is not possible to say whether the phenomenon we call terrorism is a threat at all, whether it is a phenomenon of a different nature to its predecessors, and whether there can be a theory of terrorism.

**The definition of terrorism as a moral problem**

A major stumbling block to the serious study of terrorism is that, at base, terrorism is a moral problem. This is one of the major reasons for the difficulty over the definition of terrorism. Attempts at definition often are predicated on the assumption that some classes of political violence are justifiable whereas others are not. Many would label the latter as terrorism whilst being loathe to condemn the former with a term that is usually used as an epithet. For a definition to be universally accepted it must transcend behavioural description to include individual motivation, social milieu, and political purpose. The same behaviour will or will not be viewed as terrorism by any particular observer according to differences in these other factors. However, if a definition is to be of use to a wider audience than the individual who constructs it, students of violence will have to try and divest themselves of the traditional ways of definition. Just as an increasing number of commentators seem to be able to even-handedly apply the term 'terrorist' to non-state and state actors they will have to apply it even-handedly to those groups with whose cause they agree and those with whose cause they conflict. The difficulty is that different groups of users of definitions find it more or less easy to utilise definitions which focus on behaviours and their effects as opposed to these factors tempered by considerations of motives and politics. Thus many academic students of terrorism seem to find little difficulty in labelling an event as 'terrorist' without making a moral judgement about the act. Many politicians, law enforcement and governmental officials, and citizens find themselves unable to take such a detached view. For this reason, it may not be too difficult to construct an acceptable definition within a given reference group. The problem arises when that group attempts to engage in dialogue with others.

This communication problem is of more than academic importance. It is one of the root causes of both the vacillations in policy which characterise the responses of most individual states to terrorism and of the complete failure of the international community to launch any effective multi-lateral initiatives to combat the problem. Within a given community those who study terrorism often cannot communicate with the policy-makers and law-enforcers because the latter groups often reject the analytical techniques of the former as being of insufficient relevance to the real world. Part, at least, of this lack of relevance is seen as an inability to distinguish between 'right' and 'wrong' acts. At the international level, the political support given to sectional interests militates against a universal definition that could form the basis for international law and action. Thus, for example, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is seen by some nations as a terrorist group

having no political legitimacy and using morally unjustifiable methods of violence to achieve unacceptable ends. On the other hand, other nations view the PLO as the legitimate representatives of an oppressed people using necessary and justifiable violence (not terrorism) to achieve just and inevitable ends. The definition rests, then, on moral justification. But, in fact, the proper study of terrorism should seek to explain a phenomenon, not justify it. And it must be realised by all that explanation does not entail justification.

### **The social meaning of terrorism**

The slippery nature of the concept of terrorism (however it may finally be defined) is illustrated well by its selective use, particularly its selective pejorative use. Before turning to the task of constructing a working definition, it is instructive to consider how social meaning is assigned to the word 'terrorism'. One way to approach this problem is to utilise Berger and Luckman's analysis of the social construction of reality.<sup>1</sup> According to Berger and Luckman, social order is a totally human product and social reality is a process. People are continually making society and this society produces 'social' human beings. Accordingly, the moral meanings ascribed to people or events are situationally dependent. To those who try to view society in a disinterested manner it is obvious that change and process are characteristic of modern industrial societies. However, most people do not see society in this light because they have not been able to 'bracket' experience to arrive at this perspective. Thus Greisman notes: 'Frequently, people lend a concreteness and objectivity to social relations and institutions which, though purely conjectural in origin, become real in its consequences.'<sup>2</sup> Further, since powerful groups may benefit from such 'objectivity' they encourage such perceptions by the manipulation of information. Thus both institutions and roles become reified (that is, converted from the abstract to the material).

Greisman uses these concepts to analyse the way in which social meaning is assigned to terrorism. Most commentators on terrorism acknowledge the problem of value-neutrality in defining terrorism. What is described as terrorism by one group may be variously regarded as heroism, foreign policy, or justice by others. This has led a number of writers to contend that the term 'terrorism' cannot be used as a behavioural description because it will always carry the flavour of some moral judgement. However, its central place as a theme in violent struggle forces us to accord it some serious attention. Greisman argues that to make the term useful it is necessary to see how moral meanings are ascribed to terrorist acts so that we can see what variables make one act terrorist and

another a mere function of foreign policy. Greisman borrows the concept of 'identification' from Kenneth Burke's *Rhetoric of Motives* to begin his analysis. Burke claimed that successful rhetorical persuasion results from creating in the observer an image of himself, which the observer can overlay with hopes of gain, be they monetary, emotional, or cosmic.<sup>3</sup> To the average observer *legitimacy* is the factor which draws them toward such identification. 'Legitimacy is a social product, and when it extends in a highly abstracted way to governments, these governments and these agents become reified.'<sup>4</sup>

While it is easier for governments than for terrorists to legitimate their activities, terrorists often strive for legitimacy. Often, though, such an endeavour is as much an attempt to legitimate their activities in their own eyes as it is to convince the public of their worthiness. In such cases the motivation for legitimization is more psychological than tactical. Nevertheless some broadly based non-government organisations employing terrorist tactics have succeeded in having a large degree of legitimacy ascribed to them. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is regarded as a legitimate government by many Palestinians – and non-Palestinians worldwide. Fletcher has described how many terrorists go about this legitimization process:

They regard themselves as the only possible remedy to the evils of the Establishment, and assert the "legality" of their actions. They solemnly claim sovereign rights for their organisations as they flaunt sovereignty's trappings and mannerisms. Thus, many call themselves soldiers, and adopt military designations for their organisations – for example, the IRA, JRA, Black Liberation Army, the Red Brigade, the Mohamed Boudia Commando, the Ulster Volunteer Forces and so on. They hold their victims in "people's prisons" and announce "trials", "sentences", and "executions" and they become a sovereign entity when they successfully force newspapers, radio, and television to publicise their manifestos and ultimatums word for word.<sup>5</sup>

It may be argued that this reified perception of government is one reason why terrorist acts by individuals or non-state actors and governments are ascribed different moral meanings, even though they may have the same net effect. Behavioural and stylistic variables which have come to characterise the two types of terrorism also contribute to this bifurcation in moral meanings. There are a number of obvious differences between the behavioural styles of governments and individual or non-state terrorists. The former draw on substantial resources and well-recognised claims to legitimacy, while individuals have little such claim and are typified by meagre resources and frugal modes of violence. Stylistic variables also contribute to the perceived differences. Foremost among these is the portrayal of the nation-state actors as *rational* beings whose actions serve a larger goal. The impression is fostered of persons of self-control, logic, and a sense of responsibility. These impressions are reinforced by lifestyles of

conservatism and attractiveness. The individual terrorist actor by contrast is portrayed as irrational, driven by a deranged mind, and with aims of self-interest or illogical destructiveness. The difference is further reinforced by the weapons which each may choose and the manner in which they carry them. Often there are negative connotations to the weapons of the individual terrorist – stolen firearms, bombs, rockets aimed at civilian targets. The negative image of 'fighting dirty' is further impressed upon the public by the fact that terrorist weapons are usually concealed from view and frequently have the appearance of being less discriminating of targets than weapons used by government forces. Of course this is not necessarily true. It is just that government forces less often employ such weapons against civilian targets. Many obvious examples come to mind. Consider the image of a British soldier in Northern Ireland armed with a standard infantry rifle. Consider by way of contrast a crudely made time bomb planted in a pub or car. These images are replete with social meanings. The soldier may be portrayed as a controlled individual legitimately carrying his weapon, openly displayed. He must personally aim the rifle and will witness its consequences. The person who plants a bomb carries no such stamp of legitimacy. The bomb is placed in secret, will have unpredictable, and indiscriminating (and more horrendous?) effects, and will explode after the bomb-placer has decamped (and by implication does not take personal responsibility for, nor even has to witness, the carnage that may have been caused). Weapons disguised as everyday objects (such as letter-bombs) may especially be open to interpretation as cowardly and illegitimate. Thus the violence of official terrorism is reified and legitimised and that of the individual is not.

### **Terrorism and 'identification'**

One final factor deserves note in this process. If it is true that identification is the key to rhetorical success, then an act will become to be seen as terrorist if people identify with the victim of the act. (The role of the media as instruments of legitimisation is particularly noteworthy. A similar process of identification occurs in other areas such as mugging, environmental crimes, white collar crimes, etc.) If the identification is with the perpetrator, the act is viewed in positive (or at worst neutral or ambivalent) terms. This has implications for official regimes which practise terrorism. If such states are industrialised societies then industries are active participants in official terrorism (and so by extension are their employees). Further, state terror usually involves a bureaucracy (police, armed services, intelligence agencies, secret police, immigration control, information control, etc.) which, in essence, is the administration of terror (either directly or indirectly) by large

numbers of citizens. (It could be argued that some terrorist groups, e.g. the Irish Republican Army, also have bureaucracies. But such a structure is more relevant to the organisation itself rather than society at large. It is largely a question of scale.) Because large numbers of the population participate to some degree in government-approved acts of violence, identification with the victim is problematic. Consequently, officially reified terror is not accorded the label 'terrorism' – the terrorist social meaning is absent. This reification and the legitimacy of official terrorism allows individual terrorism to be condemned as morally repugnant and official terrorism either not to be recognised at all or accepted as severe, but necessary. The serious student of terrorism must therefore make a deliberate decision about how to treat the term *terrorism* – banish it altogether since it may degenerate into little more than moralised name-calling, or acknowledge that some useful distinction between types of violence may be made if the concept is retained but apply the term even-handedly to governments, groups, and individuals. In this work the latter strategy will be adopted, although the focus will be primarily on individual or small-group terrorism.

### **Definitions of terrorism**

In order to appreciate the nature of terrorism it is necessary to look at the definitions and concepts of terror and terrorism and to examine their often ambiguous relation to other forms of civil, military, and political violence and to criminal behaviour. Wilkinson notes that one of the central problems in defining terrorism lies with the subjective nature of terror.<sup>6</sup> We all have different thresholds of fear and our personal and cultural backgrounds make certain images, experiences, or fears more terrifying to each of us than to others. Because of the complex interplay of the subjective forces and of frequently irrational individual responses it is very difficult to accurately define terror and to study it scientifically. For this reason, and because of its inherently ideological nature, behavioural scientists have tended, until recently, to steer clear of the subject of terror and terrorism. Historians and social philosophers have not been so reluctant, however, and have provided valuable information which will be drawn upon in this discussion. In particular, they have studied those leaders, regimes and governments responsible for developing explicit theories and policies of terrorism, or have attempted to assess the socio-economic and political preconditions for and consequences of terrorism.

The first thing noted by these scholars is that the use of terror need not be politically motivated. It is obvious that criminals are more and more resorting to terrorist-type tactics for personal gain. Mentally unstable

individuals may also terrorise others because of their condition. Finally, some members of society who are bored and/or sadistic may terrorise others to express their frustrations, vent their rage, or engage in symbolic acts of protest against society. The distinctions between various forms of terrorism are sometimes blurred by the fact that criminals or psychopaths who employ terror tactics may pretend to legitimate their actions by adopting political slogans (and who is to say where rationalisation ends and sincere political justification begins?), and because what we will term *terrorist* movements often recruit assistance from, and collaborate with, criminals. These confusions, together with the use of the word 'terrorism' almost entirely as a pejorative term to refer to the actions of some opposing organisation make problems of definition almost insoluble. As already noted, the problem is further complicated by the unwillingness of many to acknowledge that terrorism, whatever the definition may be, is as much a tool of states and governments as of revolutionaries and political extremists. It is all too easy to focus on the outlandish activities of small groups to the exclusion of the institutionalised, 'official' terrorism practised by a number of readily identifiable regimes. However, in order to discuss this topic meaningfully it is necessary to accept some basic definitions.

The first, and easiest, distinction to make is between terror and terrorism. The use of terror in itself does not constitute *terrorism*. As noted above, terror may be employed for criminal or personal ends. This area is not the subject of this book. Neither will we discuss the terror which is a by-product of wars. This work is concerned with the employment of terror as a weapon of psychological warfare for political ends. Consideration will also be given to terrorism used as a deliberate method of guerrilla warfare and therefore serving military ends.

Within this framework, many have tried to refine the definition of terrorism. For Thornton, terrorism is the use of terror as 'a symbolic act designed to influence political behaviour by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence'.<sup>7</sup> Terrorism may achieve political ends by either mobilising forces sympathetic to the cause of the terrorists or by immobilising the forces of the incumbent authorities. The authorities have a certain initial advantage because of the inertia which characterises the normal political relationship between authority and citizenry. The terrorists are often viewed as a malignant growth which should be excised. According to Thornton one of the first and most vital tasks of an insurgent group is to disrupt this inertial relationship between the incumbents and the citizenry. Thus,

In order to do this, the insurgents must break the tie that binds the mass to the incumbents within the society, and they must remove the structural supports that give society its strength – or at least make those supports seem irrelevant to the

## 10      *The problem of defining terrorism*

critical problems that the mass must face. This process is one of disorientation, the most characteristic use of terror . . .<sup>8</sup>

An important emphasis in Thornton's definition of terrorism is on its *extranormal* quality. The use of terror may be placed in the upper levels of a continuum of political agitation, above political violence (such as riots). It is the extranormal nature of the use of terror that distinguishes it from other forms of political violence. Thornton is then faced with the difficulty, however, of defining 'extranormal' – a difficulty that he does not resolve. It would seem to be more productive to seek other ways by which terrorism might be distinguished from, for example, mugging – both of which have the effect of producing a state of terror in the victim. It seems on the surface that a distinguishing feature is that terrorism affects an audience wider than the primary victim. However, the same is true of mugging, although the audience may not be as large. If a number of muggings take place in certain locations, intense fear will be engendered in many other individuals who have cause to be in or near those places. The distinguishing feature, then, is the *design* to create anxiety rather than the 'extranormality' of the anxiety.

Terrorism is further characterised by its high symbolic content. Thornton contends that the symbolic nature of terrorism contributes significantly to its relatively high efficacy.

If the terrorist comprehends that he is seeking a demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum symbolic value. The symbols of the state are particularly important, but perhaps even more are those referring to the normative structures and relationships that constitute the supporting framework of society. By showing the weakness of this framework, the insurgents demonstrate, not only their own strength and the weakness of the incumbents but also the inability of the society to provide support for its members in a time of crisis.<sup>9</sup>

### **Enforcement terror and agitational terror**

Within this definition of terrorism, Thornton distinguishes two broad categories of the use of terror.<sup>10</sup> The first is *enforcement terror* which is used by those in power who wish to suppress challenges to their authority, and the second is *agitational terror* which describes the terroristic activities of those who wish to disrupt the existing order and ascend to political power themselves. His analysis thus meets the requirements of even-handed application of the concept of terrorism to the activities of both insurgents and incumbents. A similar distinction is observed by May who divides terrorism into two kinds: the regime of terror and the siege of terror.<sup>11</sup> The former refers to terrorism in the service of established order, while the latter refers to terrorism in the service of revolutionary movements. May acknowledges that the regime of terror is the more important of the two but

notes how the siege of terror is what grips our attention: 'revolutionary terrorism, derivative and reflexive though it may be, exposes a level of perception into the universe of killing and being killed that may be even more revealing than state terrorism'.<sup>12</sup>

In fact it is one of the interesting puzzles of the study of terrorism as to why commentators and scholars tend to focus on the insurgent as opposed to the incumbent variety. There are a number of apparent explanations. As will be discussed in detail later, one of the hallmarks of terrorism is its dramatic, newsmaking nature. When terrorism becomes institutionalised as a form of government it makes the headlines less often. Government by terror simply has less news-value than the hijacking of an airliner. Another reason for the lack of attention paid to what May calls the 'reign of terror' may be traced back to the processes of constructing social realities discussed earlier. The portrayal of official terrorists as rational beings compared with the lunatic and out-of-control individual terrorist encourages the mass of society to see the threat to their physical and psychic integrity coming from the latter direction. Many adopt the attitude that while state terrorism may be undesirable and something eventually to be struggled against, the immediate threat comes from individual terrorists. It is the element of uncertainty that plays a large part here. State terrorism may be brutal and unjust but, in general, one knows what activities not to indulge in in order to escape its immediate and personal intrusion. Individual terrorism by contrast bears no necessary relation to one's own behaviour. It appears random and therefore more dangerous. Here again the impact of the media is an important factor. It must be remembered that many states currently experiencing terrorism are authoritarian ones or have some form of news control (some overt, some subtle). In such cases the media can hardly castigate authoritarian governments for their excesses – fearing reprisals such as licence cancellation – but they can, and do, bring terrorism by individuals or small groups into the homes of everyone. The view is therefore fostered of a society plagued by dangerous extremists damaging the fabric of everyday life and threatening the state while ignoring the often greater damage being perpetrated as a result of government policies and actions. Of course it is much easier to focus on a specific perpetrator than on an amorphous system. Finally, there are some sensible practical reasons for the reluctance of scholars to study state terrorism. Groom has noted that:

historians find it difficult to think themselves into the mores of a Robespierre's or a Stalin's reign of terror and it is dangerous to conduct field research in contemporary regimes of terror. It is far easier to conceptualize the use of terror as a weapon to achieve a specific goal rather than as a form of regular and normal government.<sup>13</sup>

Probably the only systematic effort to develop a general theory of terrorism based on an analysis of the use of official terror is Eugene

Walter's landmark work on successive rulers of the Zulu people in the nineteenth century.<sup>14</sup> Walter views terrorism as a *process of terror* having three elements: the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction to extreme fear on the part of the victims or potential victims, and the social effects that follow the violence (or its threat) and the consequent fear.<sup>15</sup> This definition excludes restricted violence aimed at a clearly defined group of existing or past power holders in society. Episodes of terror do not constitute terrorism. A terrorist regime exercises a grip on the whole of society. Following an analysis of the use of official terror in traditional African societies Walter concludes that there are

five conditions necessary for the maintenance of a terroristic regime, which may also be understood as functional prerequisites: (1) A shared ideology that justifies violence . . . Legitimacy suppresses outrage. (2) The victims in the process of terror must be expendable . . . If the violence liquidates persons who are needed for essential tasks, or if replacements cannot be found for their roles, the system of co-operation breaks down. (3) Dissociation of the agents of violence and of the victims from ordinary social life. This double dissociation removes violence from social controls and separates the victims from sources of protection . . . (4) Terror must be balanced by working incentives that induce cooperation . . . (5) Cooperative relationships must survive the effect of the terror.<sup>16</sup>

This last point is an interesting one because it indicates that a society in which cooperation takes place in an environment devoid of friendship and trust would endure a system of terror better than a society in which cooperation is dependent on friendship and trust. 'Curiously, then, a society in which people are already isolated and atomised, divided by suspicions and mutually destructive rivalry, would support a system of terror better than a society without much chronic antagonism. If cooperative relations do not survive the deterioration of social ties under terror, the system will break down.'<sup>17</sup> It is a sobering thought when one considers how a modern industrialised society might be described!

While terrorism may be divided, without much argument, into gross categories such as siege of terror and state of terror, or enforcement terror and agitational terror, such categorisation is scarcely precise enough for more sophisticated conceptual analyses of the phenomenon under study. A priority in research in this field has been, therefore, an attempt to devise typologies which provide more precise definitions of subgroups of terrorism. Although there are many examples of such typologies,<sup>18</sup> that devised by Wilkinson is accepted by many (including the present author) as providing the clearest framework currently available for discussing terrorism.<sup>19</sup>

Wilkinson first draws a distinction between four types of terrorism – criminal, psychic, war, and political terrorism. Criminal terrorism is defined as the systematic use of terror for ends of material gain. Psychic terrorism has mystical, religious, or magical ends. War terrorism to quote

Walter's definition aims 'to paralyze the enemy, diminish his resistance, and reduce his ability to fight, with the ultimate purpose of destroying him'.<sup>20</sup> Wilkinson's main distinction between military and civil terrorism is that the former aims, generally, at annihilation and the latter at control. (However, this is a somewhat dubious distinction because military terrorism is as much involved with political/social consequences as it is with pure destruction for tactical ends.) Political terrorism is very generally defined as the systematic use or threat of violence to secure political goals.

Wilkinson's analysis begins by distinguishing between political terror and political terrorism. Political terror occurs 'in isolated acts and also in the form of extreme, indiscriminate and arbitrary mass violence'.<sup>21</sup> Such terror is neither systematic nor organised and is often difficult to control. 'Therefore neither one isolated act, nor a series of random acts is terrorism.'<sup>22</sup> By way of contrast, political terrorism 'is a sustained policy involving the waging of organised terror either on the part of the state, a movement or faction, or by a small group of individuals. Systematic terrorism invariably entails some organisational structure, however rudimentary, and some kind of theory or ideology of terror.'<sup>23</sup>

The difficulty with excluding an isolated act from the compass of terrorism, however, is that it is not possible to know how to classify any particular act until it is seen that it is or is not part of a series. Thus, a bombing that occurs today might be classified as an act of terror (not terrorism) initially, but be reclassified to an act of terrorism some days hence when further bombings establish a pattern (presuming also that the bombings meet the other criteria of political terrorism). The fact that acts can be so easily reclassified makes the distinction a rather arbitrary one. The more serious the initial act the greater the problem too. Imagine that a political group possesses a nuclear device and threatens to detonate it unless certain demands are acceded to by the government. Imagine further that this is the first act on the part of the group. Surely one would not have to wait until the group perpetrated another act for the first to be an instance of terrorism; particularly since it is theoretically possible for one such act (with a nuclear device, for example) to lead to acquiescence to the demands of the perpetrators. It seems then, that Wilkinson's exclusion of isolated acts from the ambit of terrorism and his focus on 'systematic' acts of terror makes the definition too limited to include some important (although extreme) instances of terrorism. Insofar as we are interested in analysing the degree of threat posed by particular acts, however, the concept of looking for systematic uses of terror has some utility.

**Political terrorism**

Wilkinson divides political terrorism into three types: revolutionary terrorism, sub-revolutionary terrorism, and repressive terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism is defined as the use of 'systematic tactics of terroristic violence with the objective of bringing about political revolution'.<sup>24</sup> It is characterised by four major attributes: (1) it is always a group, not an individual phenomenon, even though the groups may be very small; (2) both the revolution and the use of terror in its furtherance are always justified by some revolutionary ideology or programme; (3) there exist leaders capable of mobilising people for terrorism (Wilkinson attributes more importance to the availability of leaders as stressed by collective behaviour theorists<sup>25</sup> than he does the role of personality factors stressed by some other theorists<sup>26</sup>); (4) alternative institutional structures are created because the revolutionary movement must partake action in the political system and therefore must develop its own policy-making bodies and codification of behaviour. To give an even more precise picture of revolutionary terrorism we should add Hutchinson's list of essential properties: '(1) it is part of a revolutionary strategy; (2) it is manifested in acts of socially and politically unacceptable violence; (3) there is a pattern of symbolic or representative selection of the victims or objects of acts of terrorism; (4) the revolutionary movement deliberately intends these actions to create a psychological effect on specific groups and thereby to change their political behaviour and attitudes.'<sup>27</sup>

Having defined revolutionary terrorism, Wilkinson then divides it into various subtypes. These are:

(i) Organisations of pure terror (in which terrorism is the exclusive weapon), (ii) revolutionary and national/liberationist parties and movements in which terror is employed as an auxiliary weapon, (iii) guerrilla terrorism – rural and urban, (iv) insurrectionary terrorism – normally short-term terror in the course of a revolutionary rising, (v) the revolutionary Reign of Terror – often directed at classes and racial and religious minorities, (vi) propaganda of the deed, when this form of terror is motivated by long-term revolutionary objectives and (vii) international terrorism (that is terrorism committed outside the borders of one or all of the parties to the political conflict), where it is motivated by revolutionary objectives.<sup>28</sup>

The second category in Wilkinson's typology is Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism which is defined as terror used 'for political motives other than revolution or governmental repression'.<sup>29</sup> Whereas revolutionary terrorism seeks total change, sub-revolutionary terrorism is aimed at more limited goals such as forcing the government to change its policy on some issue, warning or punishing specific public officials, or retaliating against government actions seen as reprehensible by the terrorists.

Wilkinson's third category, Repressive Terrorism, is defined as 'the